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Aircraft accident data was analyzed to investigate the
differences in risk of Naval aircraft and to develop some
overall risk measure. To analyze risk, a flight was divided
into four risk areas; takeoff, inflight, transistion, and
landing. Accidents were assumed to occur according to a
Poisson process and tests were carried out to prove the va-
lidity of the Poisson assumption. The Poisson model yielded
two factors , the exposure to the risk areas and the perform-
ance in them, which were used to construct a risk measure
and to explain the differences in the present accident rates.
A procedure to predict risk was developed. A statistic, im-
provement index, was developed to allow a direct comparison
between different types of aircraft with respect to safety
performance with differences in risk taken into account.
Another statistic, weighted improvement index, is proposed
to provide insight into where the primary positive and nega-
tive contributions to Naval aviation safety are made in any
given year. The aircraft studied were the major Naval oper-
ational and training aircraft, and the period of primary
interest was fiscal year 1969 through fiscal year 1973.
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aircraft. Primary mission of reccon-
nissance
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Primary missions of anti-submarine
warfare, training, and logistics.
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prop aircraft. Primary mission of
training.
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"The present Naval aircraft accident rate (average number
of accidents per 10,000 flight hours) accounts for all risks
an aircraft faces during a flight. However, this rate im-
plies that the accident rate is the same for every hour of
flight. For example, if the accident rate for an aircraft
is 1.0, this implies that the accident rate for every flight
hour is .0001. This implication is not true because some
phases of flight are inherently more dangerous than others.
With this fact in mind, what is a good measure of risk for
an aircraft. In other words, does there exist some combina-
tion of aircraft accident data which is a valid measure of
overall risk? Since a flight is made up of many risks, it
seems reasonable to first look at risk by components and
then combine these in some manner for an overall risk measure
rather than trying to evaluate all risks at once. Therefore
to gain more insight into the analysis of risk, a flight
was first divided into four risk phases; takeoff, inflight,
transistion, and landing. These phases were defined accord-
ing to Naval Safety Center accident code definitions as
follows: takeoff was defined as the time from the start of
takeoff roll until the aircraft is in a climb configuration
and climbing; transistion is a combination of the time from
start of climb until reaching a cruise altitude and the time
from leaving a cruise altitude until in the landing configuration;
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landing is the time for initially in the landing configura-
tion until the completion of the landing roll; inflight is
that portion of the flight after the climb and before the
descent to land. These four areas were used to help find
an overall risk measure for an aircraft, or in other words,
a risk index. One application of this index could be to
more quantitatively explain why aircraft accident rates
differ.
B. BACKGROUND AND THEORY
To evaluate risk, what was needed was some method to
analyze aircraft accidents in an analytical framework. Be-
cause the occurrence of an aircraft accident can be con-
sidered to be an event in an accident counting process, a
Poisson approach to the problem of accident modeling and
risk analysis was used. Statistical tests were initially
carried out to determine if all aircraft accidents over a
year's period of time form a Poisson process. Tests were
also done to determine if accidents by specific types of
aircraft and by different risk areas can be considered
Poisson processes. The Poisson property of independent
increments was assumed within each risk area. It can easily
be shown that the exponential inter-arrival times and memory
less properties of the Poisson process are inherent by the
nature of aircraft accidents. A final Poisson property that
was used is that given n accidents in a period of time t,
these n accidents will be uniformly distributed over t. This
property was used in the statistical tests that the accident
11

process was of the Poisson type. The results of the tests
confirmed the Poisson assumption of aircraft accidents in
every case investigated (Appendix A) . Because of these re-
sults and assumptions, all aircraft accidents were assumed
to follow a Poisson process.
The Poisson approach represents an analytical modeling
tool that can be used in the evaluation of all accidents to
determine a risk measure. Now that this model is available,
what would be the best way to use it to develop a risk
index? First, using the Poisson assumption and also using
the reproductive property of the Poisson process, the divi-
sion of a flight into risk areas is now analytically pos-
sible. Using a Poisson model, the accident rates in each
of the four risk areas represent, in a reproductive manner,
the total accident rate. In effect, this approach modeled
aircraft accidents as an inhomogeneous Poisson process by
allowing for different accident rates in the different
phases of flight. These accident rates for each risk area
are called risk rates. The risk rates reflect the safety
performance of an aircraft in any given risk area of a
flight. Since total risk is a combination of many risks,
it would seem reasonable that the first step in developing
a risk index should be the computation of the risk rates.
By evaluating the risk in the defined areas much insight
into the breakdown of total risk can be obtained. Once risk
in the risk areas has been evaluated, it is evident that
some combination of the four risk rates will give the total
12

risk measure desired. The exact combination of these risk
rates to use to get the most valid risk index is dependent
on the approach used. One approach would be to add together
the risk rates over the four risk areas for a given aircraft
to obtain a risk index. However, the risk index obtained
in this manner does not account for the proportion of flight
time spent in each of the risk areas. Thus it seems a better
approach would be to use some weighting factor for each risk
rate to appropriately weight it in terms of the contribution
of each risk area to the total risk. The best weighting fac-
tor becomes obvious when we realize that our analytical model
is a Poisson model, and as with a normal Poisson process
another factor beside the performance (risk rate) in a risk
area which is accounted for is the exposure to risk. This
is needed to give some idea of how much an aircraft is ex-
posed to each of the risks considered. To perform a complete
risk analysis using our Poisson model, the exposure and the
performance should both be utilized in some manner in the
development and validation of a risk index for any aircraft.
With this and our weighting factor in mind, the immediate
candidate for a risk index is the present accident rate.
It has the properties required of a risk index in that it
accounts for all risks an aircraft faces and the exposure
to these risks. Because of this fact, it would seem to be
the best measure of total risk faced by an aircraft. The
accounting for of total risk by the accident rate is also a
valid concept because of the reproductive property of the
13

Poisson process. No matter how many contributions, in the
sense of risk, the present rate has, the total of these in-
dividual risks will be realized in the present accident rate.
These specific risks could include the four areas already
used, plus factors such as single engine risk, single pilot
risk, day/night risk, pilot experience level, pilot pro-
ficiency level, and many others. The reproductive property
is demonstrated by realizing that for any aircraft, the sum
over the four risk areas of the risk rate multiplied by the
exposure to risk, in percent of flight time, is equal to the
present accident rate for that aircraft. This property, the
total accounting for of the performance and exposure in each
risk area, is exactly what was desired of a risk index.
The approach of using the accident rate as a risk index
assumes that for a risk to be classified as such, it must
be realized in the form of an accident. In other words, if
no accidents occur in a risk area, the risk rate will be
zero. A reasonable alternative to this approach would be a
Bayesian approach for determining the risk index of an air-
craft. However, it is felt that the priors, which would
allow a personal input of risk evaluation, would be too
subjective to yield valid results. Also, another reason the
accident rate is superior to a Bayesian type risk index is
that when a risk changes, the accident rate will automatically
reflect the change in risk while the Bayesian approach would
have to account for the change in other, more subtle ways.
Granted, over a short period of time the accident rate may
14

not be a true measure of risk because the true performance
in a risk area may not be realized due to limited exposure.
However, over a long period of time, for instance more than
20,000 flight hours, the exposure will be sufficient so that
the accident rate will essentially approach "steady state".
As an example of this approach to risk, consider the Apollo
space program. Surely no one would say that there is no
risk in going to the moon, yet the program has had no acci-
dents, and its risk index would be zero by the accident rate
approach. However, since only four flights have been made
the program obviously has limited exposure. If 10,000
flights were made with the same record of no accidents, then
it would seem valid to say that going to the moon had a risk
close to zero. In a test and development phase like the
initial Apollo flights, a Bayesian approach would probably
be the best approach to risk analysis. However, operational
Naval aviation is well beyond these early developmental
stages and sufficient exposure exists for all aircraft eval-
uated herein to assume that the use of the accident rate as
a risk index is a valid approach.
C. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
To better evaluate overall risk, the risk rates first
had to be calculated. Since a Poisson model was being used,
calculating the risk rates was the same procedure as estimat-
ing the parameter of the Poisson process of accidents in each
risk area. To construct a risk rate for each risk area two
separate pieces of data were needed. The first of these was
15

the number of accidents in a given risk area. This was
obtained by a computer sort of accident records. The exact
procedures of the sort and a flow chart of the sort program
are given in Appendix F. In the same appendix a discussion
on the data available at Naval Safety Center is also given.
The other piece of data needed to construct a risk rate was
the time spent in each risk area for each aircraft. This
type of data was difficult to obtain because a time break-
down of total aircraft time by risk areas does not exist.
The master aircraft time file does not account for time in
these specific areas. Because of this, some method had to
be devised to obtain time in the risk areas to make the risk
analysis technique tractable. The cost and scale of a de-
brief type analysis to obtain time in the risk areas was
considered prohibitive. Also, if a debriefing type program
were used to obtain data, estimates would probably still be
given since aircrews really do not specifically keep track
of time in these four areas. Because of these restrictions,
a Delphi type approach was used to obtain the time estimates
by risk areas. The sources used were the aircraft analysts
at the Naval Safety Center, men who evaluate the safety and
are experts on a specific aircraft, and three squadrons
which operated each aircraft. First, an average sortie time
was obtained for the aircraft of interest by dividing the
total amount of flight time over the period of interest by
the total number of flights. Based on this average sortie
time, the experts were asked to estimate how many minutes
16

or fractions of minutes of this average flight would be
spent in each of the four risk areas. Climb and descent
information were obtained separately and combined into the
transistion phase data in the analysis. In this manner time
estimates for the four risk areas were obtained for each
aircraft studied. The variance in the estimates for each
aircraft was due in part to the differences in local area
procedures and specific missions of each squadron. It is
not solely variance due to errors in estimation. This var-
iance was needed in the analysis to give a true total picture
of an average flight profile for each aircraft. A more
detailed analysis might look at a given type aircraft in a
given location and find its time in the risk areas exactly.
However, in this initial look at risk, only the average time
of an aircraft in each of the risk areas was used.
After the initial collection of data on time estimates,
the average time in each risk area was shown to the analyst
concerned for any comment or revision he felt relevent. Any
disagreement with an estimate resulted in the collection of
more data on that specific aircraft in the area in question.
This process was followed by a re-evaluation by the analyst.
By this iterative Delphi method a reasonable estimate of
exposure to risk, given in the analysis by percent of flight
time in each risk area, was developed. The results of this
Delphi analysis are given in Table V. By taking the total
flight time over a given period and using the exposure data
obtained, time spent in each risk area could be determined.
17

Combining this time with the number of accidents in that risk
area over the same period yielded a risk rate for each area
and each type aircraft. These results are given later in
the discussion section in Table I.
One problem generated by this method of obtaining data
by the Delphi method, which was considered to be the only
method that could reasonably be used, was a reduction in some
possible areas of interest. For example, it was hoped an
investigation into takeoff and landing rates in both ship
and shore environments could be made. Because the time
estimates for takeoff and landing were so variable, it was
felt that extending these estimates by estimating how much
time was spent in the ship phase of operations was too great
an extension of the Delphi technique to give valid results.
Also, it had been hoped to break up the inflight portion of
risk into cruise and mission risk areas. The accident codes
would permit sorting the accidents in this way, but again
time estimates in these areas were too variable to be used
with any degree of confidence. The data was sorted by ship/
shore and cruise/mission criteria simply to give some idea
of the contributions of these areas to the basic risk rates.
The inflight risk rate is, in effect, somewhat like the
present accident rate in that it is not really one constant
rate but is made up of areas with risk rates of their own.
A sensitivity analysis was done to determine how significant
the cruise and mission risk rates might be if they were used.
The results were that, compared to the takeoff and landing
18

risk rates, the breakdown of the inflight phase into cruise
and mission areas does not yield significant additional in-
formation (Appendix B) . Thus, the inflight rate is to be
interpreted to reflect the overall risks and performance in
both the cruise and mission phases of flight for each air-
craft. A future study might look into the ship/shore and
cruise/mission risks in more detail by getting good time
estimates for the specific areas, and then using the risk
analysis procedure developed here. Using this technique,
risk rates for areas such as ship takeoff, air combat maneu-
vering, glide bombing, etc. could be found.
Since the overall accident rate is made up of the sum of
the individual risk rates multiplied by the exposure to each
risk, two pieces of data (number of accidents and total
flight time) were needed to construct a risk index for each
aircraft. Since these two pieces of data are already in-
cluded in the present accident rate, the calculation of a
risk index was reduced to calculating the accident rate of
each aircraft. This calculation was done for the major Naval
operational and training aircraft. Specifically, these were;
A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, F-4, F-8, E-2, P-3, S-2, T-28, and
T-2. The period of primary interest, fiscal year 1969 through
fiscal year 1973, was selected as a representative five year
period in which the risk rates had sufficient time to stabi-




D. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The computed table of risk rates, Table I, can be ana-
lyzed to obtain a great deal of relevent and useful informa-
tion. For instance, it can be seen that the attack and
fighter aircraft have the highest inflight accident rates.
This is expected, since, as was mentioned previously, this
rate reflects what an aircraft does inflight. Obviously the
inflight risk rates reflect the well known fact that these
type aircraft face the most risk inflight. By using the
risk rate approach, this fact is shown in a more quantita-
tive manner. By looking at Table II, the risk rates and
accident breakdown by ship/shore criteria, it can be seen
that the high takeoff rates are due about equally to ship
and shore operations for most aircraft. The exceptions to
this are the F-4 and the A- 7, which both have a great number
of ship takeoff accidents. It can be seen that aircraft with
a large number or great proportion of their takeoff accidents
on the ship tend to have the higher takeoff risk rates. This
indicates a definite trend toward the ship being a great risk
for takeoff.
In the landing risk area, the high landing risk rates
are due mainly to shipboard operations. It can be seen that
only three aircraft, the A-3, A-5, and F-8, have extremely
high landing risk rates. A closer look at the accident
breakdown shows that all of these rates consist mainly of
carrier type landing accidents. This point is further demon-
strated in Table III which shows the ship landing risk rates
20

for the fighter and attack type aircraft. The exposure
estimates for this table are only approximations, and are
not as valid as those of the risk area analysis. The cal-
culation was done only to get some idea of what the ship
landing rate might be like. The F-8's very high ship land-
ing risk rate is due in part to the fact that it primarily
operates off of the smaller carriers, and thus its higher
landing risk rate reflects the higher risk of operating off
of a small deck carrier. Some further analysis was done on
the breakdown of day/night risk rates for the high perform-
ance (i.e., fighter and attack) aircraft in the landing risk
area. The results are given in Table IV. As can be seen,
the night landing risk rates are generally quite a bit higher
than the overall landing rates. These sub-analyses were done
to investigate the factors contributing to the overall trend
of high landing risk rates. Obviously night and carrier
operations are major factors in the landing risk. It would
be interesting and profitable to extend the day/night break-
down analysis to other risk areas, but unfortunately expo-
sure data is only specifically kept by the day/night criteria
in the landing phase of operations.
The transistion risk rates are, except in two cases,
higher than the inflight rates. High transistion risk rates
in the single engine, single piloted aircraft, i.e., the A-7,
A- 4, and F-8, were expected since these aircraft have no
backup for the pilot or engine in the critical phases of




Aircraft Takeoff Inflight Transistion Landing
A-3 23.86 .46 .54 24.40
A-4 38.98 .78 1.58 10.13
A-5 31.14 1.64 1.36 48.26
A-6 • 20.81 .93 1.93 2.96
A-7 30.99 1.22 1.82 10.99
F-4 40.56 1.27 1.48 13.52
F-8 24.64 2.08 2.63 68.20
E-2 29.50 .12 .96 13.41
P-3 1.63 .04 .08 1.09
S-2 7.15 .54 .51 5.30
T-28 6.36 .19 .23 1.00
T-2 6.60 .50 .63 .71
The above rates are given in number of accidents per
10,000 risk type hours, e.g., for every 10,000 hours of time
spent during takeoff, the A-3 had 23.86 takeoff accidents.
For reference purposes in evaluating the above tables,
the Risk Indices of the aircraft for FY 69 through FY 73 are
given below:














Tabic I. Risk Rates, FY 69 Through FY 7 3
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Aircraft Total Landings Embarked Landings % Embarked
A-3 201,353 28,851 14.3
A-4 1,384,780 155,186 11.2
A-5 99,182 17,464 17.6
A-6 379,032 65,833 17.4
A-7 822,294 173,898 21.1
F-4 994,773 144,617 14.5









A-3 1172.3 8 5.30
A-4 9180.8 10 10.89
A-5 510.4 4 78.37
A-6 3529.9 2 5.66
A-7 8450.4 16 18.93
F-4 6324.9 18 28.46
F-8 1593.5 39 244.73
Table III. Landing Risk Rates, Ship/Shore Breakdown,
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(Avg. Sortie Length) Takeoff Inflight Transition Landi ng
A-
3
(2.3) .80 74.87 21.20 3. 13
A-4 (1.6) .91 79.56 14.84 4.69
A-5 (1.8) 1.74 74.42 19.90 3.93
A-6 (1.9) 1.31 83.65 11.09 3.95
A-7 (1.7) 1.35 75.53 18.70 4.41
F-4 (1.5) .97 79.46 15.28 4.29
F-8 (1.6) 1.42 77.36 18.61 2.60
E-2 (2.6) .96 75.96 19.55 3.52
P-3 (5.1) .52 87.96 9.97 1.55
S-2 (2.8) .67 89.03 7.74 2.56
T-28 (1.3) 1.0 3 72.36 16.35 10.26
T-2 (1.3) 1.92 69.56 15.06 13.46
Table V. Exposure to Risk - (By Percent of Flight Time)
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exception. The three aircraft just mentioned ranked first,
third, and fourth in transition risk rate, with the A-6
ranking second. This anomaly was investigated further and
it was found to be valid, the A-6 having a high number (8)
of climbout accidents in the period investigated. This in
turn reflected an engine problem the A-6's had during this
period which, as noted by the risk rate, increased their
risk in the transition phase. Much more analysis could be
done on the risk rates in all risk areas to answer many
specific questions concerning risk.
By using the Poisson model and the accident rate ap-
proach to risk analysis the reason why accident rates dif-
fer from aircraft to aircraft is readily apparent. By
looking at the exposure to risk and the performance in the
risk areas , two independent pieces of information used in
the Poisson model, it can be seen why the present accident
rates are like they are. For example, the P-3 is exposed
to the takeoff and landing risks less than any aircraft,
and it performs in the takeoff risk better than any air-
craft, and is second best in landing risk rate. It is ex-
posed to the inflight risk more than any aircraft, yet its
inflight rate, i.e., its performance in the inflight area,
is so low, since it faces so few risks inflight, that this
is not a major factor in its overall safety record. Its
transition risk rate is also the lowest of all the aircraft
studied. All of these factors combine to say that the P-3
should be one of the safest aircraft in the Navy. This is,
27

of course, true. As another example of what risk analysis
can tell us, we see that the T-2 is exposed to the landing
risk more than any aircraft (13.461 of a flight). This is
because it is a jet trainer aircraft, and it has relatively
short flights with a significant proportion of landing
practice in each. Despite its great exposure to the land-
ing risk, the T-2 performs so well in this critical risk
area that its overall accident rate, or risk index, is low
when compared to other jet aircraft.
The general "U" shape of the risk rates for all aircraft
is consistent throughout the analysis with the takeoff and
landing rates high compared to the inflight and transition
rates. The actual magnitude of each risk rate is determined
strictly by the aircraft's performance in that risk area.
This approach to risk analysis explains in more quantitative
terms what is shown by the present accident rate. In other
words, the present accident rate shows that a P-3 is safer
than an F-8 since it has a lower risk index. However, the
risk index by itself does not really indicate why it is safer,
By looking at the development of the risk index, though, we
are able to answer this question by looking at the exposure
to risk and the performance in the risk areas. The risk
analysis points out that these two factors, exposure and
performance, are the two keys to understanding the reasons
for differences in accident rates. Contained in the perform-
ance figures are also other risk factors such as single pilot
risk, carrier operation risk, and a multitude of different
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risks which various aircraft face in a flight. By just a
cursory look at the exposure and performance figures used
in the analysis a good idea of what an aircraft's accident
rate will be relative to other aircraft is obtained. This
is the object of risk analysis, and it is what the develop-
ment of a risk index and the risk rates makes possible.
E. PREDICTION OF RISK INDEX
After the initial formulation of the ideas on risk ana-
lysis, it was hypothesized that perhaps the theory and
techniques being used to evaluate the risk of an operational
aircraft might somehow be extended to include prediction of
risk for aircraft which were not yet operational. This
would enable the Navy to predict to some degree the safety
performance of its new aircraft.
It was obvious that the present data on accident and
risk rates was an ideal base from which to formulate any
prediction. It was assumed that a Bayesian type a priori
set of risk rates would be a valid and tractable technique
to use in the approach to prediction of risk and risk rates.
This a priori risk rate would be based on three factors:
1) risk rates of aircraft with similar flight characteris-
tics, 2) proposed exposure to risk areas, and 3) experience
with similar type aircraft. From these components a pro-
jected risk index could be determined for a new aircraft.
This a priori risk index would give the Navy some indication





The Bayesian approach here does not contradict what has
previously been decided in the rejection of the Bayesian
type approach for the assignment of a risk index to an air-
craft.
.
As mentioned previously, the aircraft being evaluated
were operational aircraft, and data in the form of actual
performance in the risk areas was available for use in de-
termining risk. The exposure was also great enough to as-
sume that the accident rate was somewhat "steady state".
In the case of prediction this type of complete data would
not be available due to the limited exposure of the aircraft.
Another approach to this problem of prediction could be
through the application of renewal and reliability theories.
It could be assumed that the accident rate of a new air-
craft was in fact a failure rate which is (hopefully) de-
creasing. The steady state rate would be the actual risk
index for the aircraft. This type of model would require a
failure rate which is gamma distributed, with the shape
parameter less than one. Unfortunately, the lack of any
real data in the critical areas of the failure curve pre-
cludes using this model and this approach. Of note in this
approach is the fact that the accident rate would be, in
reliability terminology, a hazard rate or failure rate.
Strictly speaking, this is in fact what the accident rate
is. However, to be consistent with aviation safety termin-
ology it will continue to be referred to as a risk ite.
As an example of the Bayesian approach to risk index
prediction, a projected accident rate for the F-14 will be
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computed. First, it can be assumed that the most similar
aircraft to the F-14 in the exposure to risk would be the
F-4. However, the F-4's exposure times must be modified
somewhat to reflect the F-14's greater endurance. The
actual takeoff, landing, and transition times will be simi-
lar, but all of these will be a smaller proportion of the
total flight due to the longer total flight time. In other
words, the F-14 will be exposed to these three risks less
than an F-4. Since takeoff, transition, and landing risk
areas are reduced in exposure, the inflight area is natural-
ly increased in exposure. Just by the exposure considera-
tions alone it can be seen that if an F-14 performed exactly
the same as an F-4 it would have a slightly lower accident
rate due to the lessened exposure in the critical risk
areas of takeoff and landing. However, the F-14 will most
likely not perform like an F-4. The major reason for this
change in performance is the F-14's variable geometry wings.
These give the F-14 a great performance advantage over the
F-4 in virtually all risk areas. In the takeoff area the
wings allow a lower lift off speed and a lower stall speed.
A comparable aircraft, performance wise, would probably be
an A-6. In the transition phases of climbing and descend-
ing the variable sweep wing again lowers the stall speed
and makes the aircraft much more stable in critical transi-
tion phases. In the landing phase the wing should again
give the F-14 the performance characteristics of an A-6,
i.e., it should perform very well in this phase. In the
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inflight phase the risk rate will probably be lower than the
F-4's even though the F-14 is exposed to this risk more.
The reason for this is seen in the fact that a great propor-
tion of the fighter aircraft inflight accidents are stall/
spin accidents which occur during air combat maneuvering.
Because of the F-14's computer controlled variable sweep
wings, the aircraft has not yet been spun. This character-
istic should make the F-14's inflight risk rate low compared
to the F-4's.
In Table VI the F-14 prediction data and a predicted




(F-4 values given in parentheses)
Takeoff Inflight Transition Landing
.79% (.97) 83.081 (79.46) 12.50% (15.28) 3.631 (4.29)
Predicted Risk Rates
a priori risk rate reason
Takeoff 20.0 similar to A-6 takeoff risk rate
Inflight 1.0 slightly lower than F-4 risk rate
Transition 1.3 slightly lower than F-4 risk rate
Landing 5.0 similar to and slightly more than A-6
landing risk rate.
Risk Index Calculation





= (20)-(.0079) + (l)-(.8308) + (1.3)-(.125)
+ (5)-(.0363)
=
.158 + .8308 + .1625 + 1815 = 1.33
Projected F-14 accident rate is 1.33 accidents/10,000 hours.
Table VI. Prediction of Risk Index for F-14.
Estimates from Captain Clyde Tuomcla, Head, Aviation
Safety Programs and former NAVA1RSYSCOM Deputy Program





Now that the different risk rates and their contributions
to the overall risk measure have been investigated, it would
be worthwhile to have some method to compare aircraft with
respect to safety performance and determine which is actually
performing the best when differences in risk are taken into
account. This type of comparison would enable us to look at
different aircraft and compare them in a "normalized" risk
environment. From this comparison a determination could be
made about how an aircraft is performing safetywise while
accounting for the risks it faces. Since it has already been
shown how risk varies from aircraft to aircraft, it is evi-
dent that comparing the present accident rates directly to
compare safety performance yields deceptive results. Com-
paring accident rates is really comparing both safety per-
formance and differences in risk. If all aircraft operated
in the same risk environment and had the same performance
characteristics, then comparing accident rates would be a
valid procedure of comparing safety performances. However,
since no two risk environments are the same, comparing acci-
dent rates does not account for the differences in risk of
each aircraft. Because of this, two statistics are proposed
which can help compare aircraft safetywise in a more produc-







To account for the risk differential in aircraft, a
comparative statistic was developed which was based on the
theory of using each aircraft as its own control with re-
spect to risk. This procedure is logical since each air-
craft is unique in its exposure to risk, its performance in
the risk areas, and the specific types of risk it faces in
each risk area. To compare aircraft to each other, the
first step was a normalizing step which compared each air-
craft to itself with respect to safety performance. One way
to do this normalization was by comparing an aircraft's dif-
ference in safety performance (accident rate differential)
to an average rate over some specified period. By doing
this we can see the difference in how well the aircraft per-
formed when exposed to essentially the same risks. It is
necessary to compare the differences in accident rates to an
average rate because the difference in risk alone is not a
normalized measure. For example, the difference in P-3 ac-
cident rates would be, at most, .16 while the difference in
F-8 accident rates could be as much as 2 or 3. Thus a dif-
ference of accident rates divided by the average rate over
a somewhat uniform risk period is a good measure to use to
normalize all aircraft safetywise. A statistic to do this
is designated an Improvement Index (II) and it is calculated
as follows:
TT (accident rate in year i-1) - (accident rate in year i )
i average accident rate in years i-1 and i
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If consecutive years have accident rates of zero the II is
arbitrarily set to +1, a figure rewarding consecutive zero
accident rates with an indication of substantial improve-
ment. This statistic assumes that over the two year period
of interest, years i-1 and i, the aircraft faces basically
the same risks. It then evaluates how well it faced these
risks in year i versus year i-1. This statistic has an ana-
lytical interpretation based on the Poisson model used in
risk evaluation. To see this, we first must assume that the
aircraft flies about the same amount of hours in years i and
i-1. This implies that the average accident rate over these
two years is equal to the average of the two years accident
rates. Next, we observe that the accident rates in years i
and i-1 are the rates of two independent Poisson processes.
Finally, we note that the period covered by the years i and
i-1 can be considered a period (0,t) in which both processes
occur. If these assumptions are true, the II is then equiv-
alent to:
2 ( (probability one accident in year i-1 given one
accident in years i and i-1) - (probability one accident in
year i given one accident in years i and i-1)).
The actual analytical derivation of the above formula is
presented in Appendix D.
The improvement index has several desirable attri-
butes. First, it is positive if the aircraft improved in
safety performance and negative if it declined. This is an
obvious necessity for an improvement measure. Second, the
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range of the II is from + 2 to -2 for all aircraft, thus nor-
malizing all to a common scale. The index is also not
biased in either the positive or negative direction. Fi-
nally, the index only compares an aircraft to itself. This
means that the value of the II is dependent only on the air-
craft's risk performance as compared to the risks it faces,
and it is not influenced by the actual magnitude of the ac-
cident rate.
By using the improvement index a direct comparison
of all aircraft can be made in any given year. This is pos-
sible because the trends in safety performance of the air-
craft have been reduced to probabilities and do not depend
directly on the number of accidents or the hours flown. The
aircraft with the most positive II has improved the most in
a year as compared to the previous year. On the other hand,
the one with the most negative II declined the most, or in
other words, performed worst in its risk areas considering
the risks it faced. Table VII shows values of the improve-
ment index for the aircraft studied over the period fiscal
1969 through fiscal 1973.
2 . Weighted Improvement Index
Of further interest in comparing aircraft safetywise
is the question of which aircraft is the prime contributor
to the overall safety record and which is the major detractor.
The improvement index does not really give this information
since it only indicates how much an aircraft improved or de-




Aircraft 73 7_2 71 70 69
A-3 - .75 + 1 .01 - .48 + .43 + .27
AM - .20 + .16 + .48 - .09 + .01
A-5 +1.29* - .15 + .95* + .34 - .29
A-6 - .14 + .25 + .10 - .31@ + .18
A-
7
+ .58 + .02 + .40 + .11 - .02
F-4 - .32 + .42 - .03 - .04 + .10
F-8 - .41 + .70 + .19 + .26 - .64@
E-2 - .94@ + 1 .11* -1.10 + .84 - .22
P-3 + 1.00 -1 .50@ -2.00@ +1.86* + .38
S-2 + .59 + .36 - .47 - .17
T-28 - .39 + .43 - .16 - .24 + .63*
T-2 + .83 + .28 - .13 + .42 + .31
(accident rate in year i-1) - (accident rate in year i)
i average accident rate in years i and i- 1
If denominator equals 0, II. = + 1.00.
* best in year
@ worst in year
The above figures use each aircraft as its own control and
show relative improvements in any given year. They can be
used to directly compare aircraft in a given year with respect
to safety performance.
Table VII. Improvement Index (II)
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is to the overall safety record. One way to look at each
aircraft's contribution would be to look at the magnitude
of the rates for each aircraft in a year and compare these
rates to the overall rate for the year. However, this ap-
proach does not account for differences in risk between the
aircraft compared. Since the II does account for this fac-
tor, and also gives the amount of improvement for each air-
craft individually and normalizes them, it should be a good
basis for the new measure. To account for the safety con-
tribution of an aircraft a weight was applied to each im-
provement index. This weight could have been based on one
of two factors available in safety analysis, hours flown by
an aircraft or number of accidents. Since once a valid ex-
posure is established hours flown are not significant (i.e.,
the accident rate is somewhat steady state) , the weight
chosen was based on the number of accidents. Specifically,
the weight was the percent of the total number of accidents
that a particular aircraft had over the two year period
covered by the II. A percent of the total number of acci-
dents was used instead of just the number of accidents so
that all weights would be in a fixed range (0,100) and all
would add to 100 for any year. This weighting factor placed
more emphasis on the aircraft with the most accidents, and
in this sense contributed the most to the overall safety
record. The resulting statistic is called a Weighted Im-




WTT =IT y ( to tal # of accidents by aircraft in years i-l,i ) .„„
i i (total number of accidents in years i- 1 , i)
For aircraft with many accidents even a small improvement in-
dex will yield a large WII, indicating a major contributor
or detractor to overall safety in the year. On the other
hand, aircraft with a small number of accidents, in most
cases the low risk aircraft, would need a great change in
their accident rate, yielding a large improvement index, be-
fore they were of concern. Table VIII shows the WII for the
period fiscal 1969 through fiscal 1973.
C. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
By using the improvement index and the weighted improve-
ment index all aircraft can be compared directly and on equal
terms because risk differences have been accounted for. In
looking at the improvement index table it is evident that in
general the higher risk aircraft don't have large II's. The
only exception to this is the A-5, which has a large II in
both 1975 and 1971. In both these years the A-5 performed
so well with respect to the risks that it faced that it had
one of the highest improvement indexes. Another piece of
information that can be seen in the table is that the magni-
tude of the positive II's (those showing improvement) are
generally much greater than the magnitudes of the negative
II's. This is obviously a good property showing an overall
trend to improved safety performance. One problem inherent
to the II is that it can get into cycles when an aircraft




Aircraft 73 72 11 70 69
A-3 - 2.05 + 3.41 - 1.670 + 1.25 + 1.13
A-4 - 4.55 + 3.30 + ;11.74* - 2.590 + .12
A-5 + 2.37 - .34 + 2.23 + 1.05 - .87
A-6 - 1.14 + 1.84 + .61 - 1.43 + .59
A-
7
+ 11.78* + .42 + 6.89 + 1.65 - .19
F-4 - 7.320 + 8.78* - .48 - .71 + 1.69
F-8 - 3.71 + 8.05 + 3.07 + 5.12* 11.870
E-2 - 1.14 + 1.15 - .86 + .55 - .17
P-3 + 1.22 - 1.560 - .38 + .91 + .42
S-2 + 1.62 + 1.41 - 1.46 - .43
T-28 - 1.30 + 1.58 - .59 - .67 + 2.19*
T-2 + 2.02 + 1.04 - .44 + 1.69 + 1.68
WII.=II.x(% of total accidents in years i and i-1 that
aircraft had)
* best in year
§ worst in year
The magnitudes of the figures indicate significance of
aircraft's safety performance to overall Naval aviation
safety, with differences in exposure and risk. In effect,
it shows where the primary praise (most positive) and blame
(most negative) can be assigned for any given years safety
record. Looking along rows shows specific aircraft's safety
trend.
Table VIII. Weighted Improvement Index (WII)
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year's II will usually change sign and be rather large. An
example of this process is the E-2 in the 1970 to 1973 time
frame
.
It is in the WII table that the most useful information
is found. It can be seen that the positive numbers are again
larger than the negative, although not by as much as in the
II case. It is also evident that the cyclic type pattern
exhibited by the E-2 in the II table is absent here. Instead
we get some indication of which aircraft really did improve
the most be considering both its performance (II) and its
significance (I of total accidents) . An example of this is
found in the 1973 statistics. In that year the A- 5 did so
well (the II was + 1.29) that, even though it had a small
proportion of the total accidents (1.8%) it was the second
most significant contributor to the years safety record. On
the other hand, in 1972 the P-3, which has a very low risk
(.16), did so poorly that it was the major negative contrib-
utor to the overall safety record. This is despite the fact
that it had only 1% of the total number of accidents. Many
other examples and answers to particular questions can be
found in these two tables.
By using this type of comparative analysis on the risk
indices of aircraft, a true and useful representation of the
actual safety performance can be found. A similar procedure
for calculating the II and WII could also be followed in each
of the risk areas to give information on particular risk area




"It has long been recognized that to prevent accidents,
it is necessary to study accidents to identify causes and
detect problem areas so that corrective action can be
initiated"
.
The analysis carried out in this thesis is a first at-
tempt at a more enlightning evaluation of risk to gain a
better understanding of differing accident rates in the con-
text of overall aviation safety. The risk rates developed
are a unique and extremely helpful concept to evaluate an
aircraft's overall safety performance by evaluating how it
performed in certain risk areas. The risk rates are also
very helpful, in conjunction with the exposure data, to in-
vestigate and evaluate the total risk of an aircraft. Risk
itself is an elusive quantity that is hard to define, and
harder yet to calculate. It is felt that the measure of
risk proposed here is a valid measure of total risk, i.e.,
actual and inherent risk. Much more defined and specific
risk measures of these two factors would require more data
than is now available, particularly in the area of exposure
to risk. Nevertheless , even in their general context the
risk index and the risk rates can be used profitably by
Naval Safety Center and operational commands to gain insight
Gilpin, L. H., "Ask Not What You Can Do For the Computer,




into where the primary risks for an aircraft lie, and how
the aircraft are performing in these risk areas.
The comparative measures that are proposed by using the
results of the risk analysis are new and worthwhile measures
that can be used as an excellent evaluation tool. Measures
of this form to detect trends and magnitudes of contribu-
tions to safety performance are not now available. With so
much emphasis today on safety trends and improvement in
safety performance, these measures will add significantly to
the analysis and evaluation of all Naval aircraft. The mea-
sures are readily available from existing data and will be
a definite contribution to the safety analysis done at
Safety Center as well as at all major aviation commands.
As implied by the initial quote, it is hoped that this
study can achieve the primary goal of all safety studies --
to contribute to the prevention of accidents. It is felt
that the analysis presented herein can achieve this goal,
and thus prove its worth in more than a strict academic
sense, but in a safety context also.
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APPENDIX A: POISSON DATA
Poisson Theory
Theorem: Suppose that we know that n events, n > 1, of
a Poisson process have occurred by time t. Then the set of
n arrival times, {U- . . . .U }, has the same distribution as a
1 n '
set of n random variables which are independent and uniform-
ly distributed on the interval (0,t).
One way to test if a given process is a Poisson process
is to observe it for a period of time, T. We record each
event in that time period, and the time it occurred (U.)>
measured from the start of the period. According to the
above theorem, if the events are following a Poisson process
the times at which the events occur should be independent
and uniformly distributed over the period T. Thus we need
only test to see if our observed times are independent and
uniformly distributed. One way to do this is to use the
fact that, according to the Central Limit Theorem, for
moderately large values of n, the sum
n
S = E U.
n i=1 x
of n independent random variables, each uniformly distributed
on the interval to T, may be considered to be normally
Ross, Introduction to Probability Models , p. 126,











The test is then to see if S satisfies the inequalities
n n
E(S ) - 1.96(var(S )) < S < E(S ) + 1.96(var(S )).
If it does, we would accept the hypothesis that the observed
events are of the Poisson type. The test has a 95% level of
significance.
Poisson Test of All Accidents, FY 70
n








Var(S ) = nYar(U
1 )
S.D.
y - (1.96) (S.D.)






' n(11102.08) = 4873814.57
/Var(S ) = 2207.67* n^
80117.50 - 1.96(2207.67)
80117.50 - 4327.03 = 75,790.47
80117.50 + 4327.03 = 84,444.53
1962
Parzen, Stochastic Processes , p. 141, 142, IIolden-Day,
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To be Poisson, with 951 level of significance:
y - (1.96)(SD) < S 439 < ji + (1.96)(SD).
For FY 70 we get:
75,790.47 < 78,915 < 84,444.53.
Therefore the accidents for FY 70 can be considered a Poisson
process
.
Poisson Test for A-7 and Prop Aircraft, FY 72
A-7 Aircraft
n 43
S = E U. = E U. =7211
i=l 1=1n
T = 365
E(S ) = n(182.5) = 43(182.5) = 7847.5
Var(S ) = n(11102.1) = 43(11102.1) = 477389.6
S.D. = 690.9
y - 1.96(SD) = 7847.5 - 1354.2 = 6493.3
y + 1.96(SD) = 7847.5 + 1354.2 = 9201.7
6,493.3 < 7,211 < 9,201.7 So Poisson Q.E.D,
Prop Aircraft (CI , C2 ,E1 , E2 , P3 ,C130 , S2)
19
S = Z U. = 3815
n i=1 i
36 5
E(S ) = 19(182.5) = 3467.5




V + 1.96(SD) = 3467.5 + 900.2 = 4367.7
y - 1.96(SD) = 3467.5 - 900.2 = 2567.3
2,567.3 < 3,815 < 4,367.7 So Poisson Q.E.D.
Poissort Test, A-7 Landing and Inflight Accidents
A- 7 Landing Accidents
30




T = 1095 (FY 70, FY 71, FY 72)
TE(S )v n^ n 2
T 2
30(547.5) = 16425
Var(S ) = n-^r = 2997562.5v
n-^ 12
S.D. = 1731.3
y - 1.96(SD) = 16425 - 3393.4 - 13031.6
y + 1.96(SD) = 16425 + 3393.4 = 19818.4
13,031.6 < 14,606 < 19,818.4 So Poisson Q.E.D,
A-7 Inflight Accidents
33
S = .E,U. = 12560
n i = l i
T = 730 (FY 72, FY 71)
E(S ) = 33(365) = 12045
* n^
Var(S ) = 33 ^^- = 1465475v n J 12
S.D. = 1210.6
y - 1.96(SD) = 12045 - 2372.7 = 9672.3
y + 1.96(SD) = 12045 + 2372.7 = 14417.7
9672.3 < 12560 < 14417.7 So Poisson Q.E.D,
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APPENDIX B: RISK DATA
Risk Area Breakdown
Theorem: Reproductive property of the Poisson process.
If X.. X are independent Poisson random variables withIn r
n
parameters X 1 s 1 X s respectively, then Y = .E, X. isr 11 n n v J ' 1=1 1
n 5
also a Poisson random variable with parameter A = .Z 1 X.s..r i=l l l










Larson, Introduction to Probability and Statistical In -
ference
,








t_ to t., = transition time
t_ to t. = landing time
All accident rates are given in number of accidents per
10,000 hrs . Because of the reproductive property given
above, the area under both curves is the same.
Fiscal Year
Aircraft 21 72_ 21 21 69
A-3 63.63 23.08 20.75 18.52
A-4 28.13 17.69 27.24 60.08 53.18
A-5 28.79 30.00 33.48 34.15
A-6 27.26 21.35 22.81 15.95 15.53
A-7 29.09 21.34 30.26 43. 17 36.85
F-4 49.44 31.34 42.52 38.43 41.55
F-8 11.66 20.49 25.19 6.76 50.46
E-2 55.85 50.98 43.57
P-3 • 8.51
S-2 7.0 3 15.42 8.54
T-28 5.04 15.37 3.96 7.02
T-2 4.45 4.77 8.28 4.11 10.20



















































Table X. Inflight Risk Rates, FY 69 Through FY 73
Fiscal Year
Aircraft 73 72 71 70 6_9
A-3 1.11 1.39
A-4 1.29 1.30 1.46 2.71 1.18
A-5 2.43 2.98
A-6 .97 3.04 2.16 3.40 2.21
A-7 .70 2.57 1.64 1.73 3.10
F-4 1.74 .66 3.04 1.21 .88




S-2 .68 1.21 .44 .37
T-28 .37 .32 .64
T-2 1.06 .52 1.30




Aircraft 73 72 71 70 6_9
A-3 16.26 15.07 36.50 26.52 23.66
A-4 9.55 5.49 7.93 11.66 140. 71
A-5 12.31 39.86 59.29 90.72
A-6 6.78 2.36 5.04
A-7 3.96 8.71 10.42 20.55 16.92
F-4 16.15 11.81 12.02 13.04 14.61
F-8 38.22 27.98 73.40 77.63 96.46
E-2 12.78 30.46 23.76
P-3 2.63 2.85
S-2 4.11 5.58 7.36 4.03 4.47
T-28 2.38 .51 1.19 1.05
T-2 .68 1.76 .97
Table XII. Landing Risk Rates
,































The above figures indicate what the cruise and mission
risk rates would be if cruise and mission were the indicated
percentages of the inflight portion of a flight.
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APPENDIX D: ANALYTICAL BASIS OF COMPARATIVE MEASURES
Letting r. be the accident rate in year i for the air-
craft of interest, the improvement index, by definition, is
II




If we assume that the average rate for the two years is
r
.






Ci-i' (.r± ) >(*!-!) 2(rj)
i r . 1 + r . r . , + r . r-.+r. r - .. + r
.
i-l l i-I i i-l i l-l i
= 2
i-l
r- H+r. r. , + r
.
i-l i i-l i
The quantities in the brackets above can be interpreted
in the following manner. Since the accident process in each
year is of the Poisson type, the accident rates for years i,
i-l, and both years combined are r., r. 1S and r. + r. -,' ' i ' i-l ' li-l
respectively. From this fact it can be shown that if
p = P[exactly one accident in years i-l and i]






= (r. .. + r.)






v l- 1 x J
e
and
p.. = P[exactly one accident in year i-1 given one
accident in years i-1 and i]
P[one accident in year i-1 and none in year i]
P
-r. n -r.l-l l
r. ,e e r. *l-l i-I




" 1 x 1 ' 1
v i-I i J
Using the same rationale, defining p- as the probability of
exactly one accident in year i given one accident in years
i-1 and i we get
r
i
r- 1 + r.i-I i
The range of each of these ratios is from to 1, and thus
the improvement index will range from -2 to + 2.
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APPENDIX E: MISCELLANEOUS DATA
FY AjJS A^ Aj^ Aj^ Aj^ Fj^ 1^8
60 66,601 186,464 136,802
61 79,605 234,846 171,042
62 85,692 321,526 190,003
63 82,142 335,209 9,496 53,080 199,558
64 80,971 383,076 14,704 85,267 230,570
65 72,134 406,637 13,898 16,128 111,339 218,735
66 73,896 459,351 17,942 30,911 161,499 202,454
67 72,778 446,053 17,319 55,155 14,466 189,153 172,732
68 69,518 481,996 16,400 76,828 58,619 202,158 138,703
69 67,479 454,594 16,828 98,263 120,582 223,273 111,633
70 60,241 347,484 17,167 95,701 154,419 214,575 104,036
71 52,511 322,719 19,151 100,388 195,797 193,933 83,841
72 42,403 310,533 20,666 107,254 208,227 197,364 68,724
73 39,285 312,484 19,963 111,995 229,124 187,649 60,382
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This data was taken from the one liners by model aircraft
for FY 70. The accidents are not in chronological order.
The accident numbers are arbitrary. The day column is the
day each accident occurred during the year. Since only the
sums of the waiting times (i.e., days of the accidents) were
used in the statistical tests, the actual accident-day match-
up is not of significance. This format applies to Tables
XVIII and XIX also.
Accident Day Accident Day Accident Day Accident Day
1 273 31 340 61 68 91 42
2 57 32 213 62 316 92 1
3 49 33 258 63 43 93 123
4 22 34 185 64 155 94 356
5 249 35 148 65 41 95 34
6 220 36 170 66 181 96 23
7 136 37 164 67 332 97 ^ r- -rL b O
8 222 38 128 68 2 79 98 65
9 188 39 206 69 262 99 288
10 73 40 229 70 22 100 23911 119 41 341 71 184 101 4812 127 42 142 72 180 102 23213 73 43 291 73 129 103 35414 208 44 107 74 331 104 36115 182 45 365 75 299 105 26016 330 46 223 76 227 106 16017 204 47 226 77 185 107 18918 213 48 41 78 265 108 6419 174 49 277 79 228 109 6020 198 50 302 80 244 110 11421 309 51 196 81 323 Ul 32322 174 5 2 24 7 82 93 112 423 172 53 4 83 297 113 10124 363 54 211 84 234 114 264
25 58 55 56 85 10 7 115 16426 293 56 193 86 19 116 175
27 8 57 231 87 294 117 320
28 330 58 87 88 241 118 122
29 127 59 228 89 230 119 64
30 158 60 159 90 48 120 212
Table XVII. FY 70, All Ace.Ldent Wait ine Times .
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Accident Day Accident Day Accident
•
Day Occident Day
121 65 172 207 223 11 274 37
122 150 173 217 224 69 275 283
123 167 174 212 225 38 276 102
124 99 175 363 226 169 277 200
125 320 176 76 227 171 278 162
126 14 177 227 228 328 279 4
127 176 178 136 229 151 280 69
128 215 179 164 230 298 281 9
129 225 180 180 231 69 282 71
130 52 181 304 232 162 283 63
131 128 182 248 233 354 284 351
132 58 183 100 234 85 285 336
133 318 184 257 235 81 286 214
134 289 185 49 236 184 287 218
135 37 186 351 237 160 288 201
136 68 187 136 238 84 289 215
137 61 188 297 239 222 290 177
138 317 189 177 240 164 291 169
139 248 190 84 241 69 292 298
140 202 191 44 242 68 293 250
141 153 192 189 243 149 294 147
142 203 193 344 244 188 295 239
143 78 194 263 245 78 296 76
144 231 195 225 246 111 297 253
145 92 196 20 247 193 298 128
146 321 197 302 248 52 299 64
147 83 198 138 249 121 300 218
148 161 199 56 250 9 301 274
149 76 200 280 251 350 302 310
150 315 201 188 252 271 303 307
151 361 202 144 253 143 304 72
152 163 203 39 254 333 305 339
153 177 204 96 255 327 306 280
154 100 205 293 256 215 307 259
155 19 2 206 185 257 300 308 58
156 353 207 49 2 58 136 309 85
157 295 208 80 259 225 310 226
158 110 209 182 260 226 311 349
159 130 210 311 261 67 312 338
160 167 211 263 262 185 313 129
161 176 212 79 26 3 166 314 259
162 45 213 173 264 156 315 104
163 131 214 315 265 51 316 266
164 170 215 23S 266 34 317 2 76
165 156 216 86 26 7 169 318 331
166 192 217 218 268 129 319 73
167 305 218 115 269 256 320 201
168 146 219 236 270 357 321 177
169 276 220 246 271 129 322 9
170 82 221 141 272 352 323 128















326 307 356 107 384 67 412 13
327 357 357 350 385 39 413 184
328 211 358 149 386 97 414 226
329 17 359 58 387 255 415 175
330 164 360 64 388 86 416 114
331 134 361 111 389 306 417 256
332 41 362 93 390 186 418 289
333 163 363 56 391 245 419 211
334 207 364 192 392 125 420 270
335 47 365 77 393 40 - 421 154
336 153 366 238 394 176 422 304
337 117 367 69 395 127 423 36
338 239 368 292 396 51 424 193
339 224 369 198 397 251 425 83
340 249 370 128 398 269 426 326
341 223 371 214 399 244 427 174
342 29 372 224 400 184 428 195
343 40 373 91 401 322 429 341
344 248 374 87 402 285 430 156
345 52 375 186 403 63 431 132
346 126 376 363 404 323 432 161
347 192 377 223 405 210 433 76
348 262 378 11 406 291 434 284
349 339 379 48 407 118 4 35 328
350 58 380 224 408 212 436 315
351 262 381 70 409 329 437 204
352 11 382 117 410 57 438 222































































































2 159 889 17 307 672
3 42 772 18 175 175
4 322 1052 19 14 14
5 210 940 20 176 176
6 233 963 21 235 235
7 281 1011 22 52 52
8 137 867 23 289 289
9 305 670 24 68 68
10 317 682 25 202 202
11 195 560 26 321 321
12 294 659 27 163 163
13 36 401 28 353 353
14 97 462 29 130 130
15 48 413 30 45 45
A- 7 inflight Accidents
(FY 71,7 2)











2 266 631 19 166 166
3 105 470 20 342 342
4 179 544 21 323 323
5 171 536 22 25 25
6 67 432 23 108 10 8
7 274 639 24 364 364
8 146 511 25 339 339
9 336 701 26 171 171
10 337 702 27 77 77
11 83 448 28 226 226
12 251 616 29 127 127
13 309 674 30 338 338
14 67 432 31 167 167
15 31 396 3 2 321 321
16 175 540 33 49 49
17 113 478
Table XIX. A- 7 Landing and Inflight Accident Waiting Times
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Takeoff Climb Inflight Descent Land
1.5 25 92.5 15 4
.7 10 108.3 14 5
1.0 9 108.0 15 4
1.0 10 76.0 6 3
1.0 8 77.0 5 5
1.0 6 78.0 6 5
.5 6 74.5 10 5
3.0 12 79.0 10 4
1.5 12 76.5 12 6
2.0 10 82.0 12 2
1.0 10 84.0 8 5
1.0 6 96.0 8 3
1.0 3 100.0 5 5






1.0 9 78.0 10 4
2.0 7 78.0 10 5
1.5 5.5 82.0 10 3
1.0 12 80.0 12 6
1.0 12 64.0 10 3
1.0 3 73.0 8 5
.5 3 73.5 9 4
1.0 3 75.5 7 3.5
2.0 10 71.0 10 3
2.0 10 69.0 13 2
.5 10 7 3.5 10 2











1.0 16 120.0 16 3
RVAW-120 1.0 19 115.0 15 6
VAW-113 1.0 18 122.0 12 3




1.0 15 275.0 14 2
VP-31 1.5 15 265.5 15 9
VP-40 3.0 15 266.0 15 7








1.2 6 153.6 6 1.2
VT-28 1.8 6 148.2 6 6
VS-30 .75 4 146.25 11 6




1.0 5 74.0 5 5
VT-2 .25 5 59.75 4 3
VT-6 1.0 6 41.00 11 19




1.0 8 55.0 5 3
VT-9 2.0 8 37.0 5 20
VT-23 2.0 4 62.0 6 4
VT-26 1.0 4 41.0 7 15
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(TOTAL HOURS 261,919) Aj^ (ACCIDENT RATE 1.41)




Phase 2,095.35 196,098.75 55,526.82 8,198.06
II. # Accidents
in Phase 5 9 3 20
III. Risk Rate 23.86 .46 .54 24.40
(1,747,814) A^ (1.68)
I. 15,905.11 1,390,560.81 259,375.59 81,972.47
II. 62 108 41 83
III. 38.98 .78 1.58 10.13
(73,812) A^ (3.93)
I. 1,284.33 54,930.89 14,688.59 2,900.81
II. 4 9 2 14
III. 31.14 1.64 1.36 48.26
(513,601) Aj^ (1.38)
I. 6,728.17 429,627.93 56,958.35 20,287.24
II. 14 40 11 6
III. 20.81 .93 1.93 2.96
(908,149) A^ (2.17)
I. 12,260.01 685,924.94 169,823.86 40,049.37
II. 38 84 31 44
III. 30.99 1.22 1.82 10.99
Computation of Risk Rates, FY 69 Through FY 73
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Computation of Risk Rates continued
(1,016,794) 1^4 (2.21)
I. 9,862.90 807,944.51 155,366.12 43,620.46
II. 40 103 23 59
III. 40.56 1.27 1.48 13.52
(428,616) 1^8 (4.22)
I. 6,086.35 331,577.34 79,765.44 11,144.02
II. 15 69 21 76
III. 24.64 2.08 2.63 68.20
(105,920) E^ (1.04)
I. 1,016.83 80,456.83 20,707.36 3,728.38
II. 3 12 5
III. 29.50 .12 .96 13.41
(1,176,553) 1^3 (.07)
I. 6,118.07 1,034,896.02 117,302.33 18,236.57
II. 14 12
III. 1.63 .04 .08 1.09
(1,252,231) 5^2 (.27)
I. 8,389.95 1,114,861.26 96,922.68 32,057.11
II. 6 6 5 17
III. 7.15 .54 .51 5.30
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12,124 439,270 95,103 84,499
8 22 6 6
6.60 .50 .63 .71
(1,067,916) T-28 (.35)
I. 10,999 772,744 174,604 109,568
II. 7 15 4 11




FY Takeoff Inflight Transition Landing Total
60 2 5 4 10 21
61 5 3 1 19 28
62 2 3 2 9 16
63 1 4 1 10 16
64 1 3 2 8 14
65 2 3 1 1 7
66 2 7
67 2 1 3 4 10
68 3 2 3 8- 16
69 1 2 2 5 10
70 1 2 5 8
71 1 3 6 10




60 5 22 12 18 57
61 13 25 7 30 75
62 10 24 10 27 71
63 5 21 7 38 71
64 13 32 13 92 87
65 7 27 7 28 69
66 19 41 3 38 101
67 14 34 13 40 101
68 17 40 12 29 98
69 22 32 8 30 92
70 19 29 14 19 81
71 8 18 7 12 45






61 1 1 2
62 1 2 3
63 2 1 3 6
64 1 4 2 7
65 1 5 1 4 11
66 1 1 12 14
67 1 1 7 9
68 1 3 1 3 8
69 1 3 1 6 11
70 1 3 4 8
71 1 3 4
72 3 1 1 5
73 1 1
Table XXI. Accident Breakdown, FY 69 Through FY 73
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Table XXI. con tinued
A-6
FY Takeoff Inflight Transition Landing Total
64 1 1
65 1 1
66 2 6 1 9
67 3 3 2 8
68 4 5 9
69 2 8 2 12
70 2 11 3 16
71 3 9 2 2 16
72 3 5 3 1 12





68 3 12 1 3 19
69 6 20 7 42
70 9 21 5 14 49
71 8 16 6 9 39
72 6 17 10 8 41








69 1 2 3
70 1 1






61 1 1 1 1 4
62 6 1 4 11
63 4 6 1 12 23
64 4 6 7 24 41
65 9 10 5 11 35
66 6 16 4 16 42
67 12 26 3 19 60
68 12 20 7 16 55
69 9 25 3 14 51
70 8 26 4 12 50





FY Takeo ££ Inflight Transition Landing Total






60 11 25 12 24 72
61 10 21 11 35 77
62 9 35 13 39 96
63 11 18 17 46 92
64 12 24 8 36 80
65 13 20 8 55 96
66 5 14 12 30 61
67 12 26 5 35 78
68 6 17 4 20 47
69 8 27 6 28 69
70 1 23 5 21 50
71 3 8 5 16 32








65 1 2 3
66 1 1 2
67
68 3 1 4
69 1 1 1 3
70
71 1 1




60 3 4 3 11 21
61 4 5 2 4 15
62 4 1 15 20
63 1 4 1 5 11
64 1 5 2 7 15
65 6 4 2 6 18
66 2 4 3 9
67 2 2 1 2 7
68 3 2 2 4 11
69 2 1 1 4 8
70 3 1 3 7





FY Takeoff Inflight Transition Landing Total




60 2 1 r 4
61 3 1 2 1 7
62 1 4 2 1 8
63 1 1 2 4
64 2 1 3
65 2 1 1 4
66 2 5 3 2 12
67 3 1 3 7
68 1
,
8 1 7 17
69 3 9 3 2 17
70 1 3 1 3 8
71 2 5 2 9




60 10 7 9 7 33
61 9 7 3 8 27
62 3 9 4 10 26
63 6 9 4 7 26
64 8 6 2 6 22
65 4 7 4 5 20
66 5 2 3 10 20
67 3 6 1 4 14
68 1 7 3 4 15
69 2 2 3 7
70 1 6 3 10
71 3 3 2 1 9
72 1 3 1 5
73 1 1 4 6
72

APPENDIX F: A DISCUSSION OF DATA COLLECTION
All aircraft accident data available at Naval Safety
Center was stored on magnetic computer tape. It was pro-
cessed through a Honeywell H-1200 computer which has a
114,000 core storage capability. Available data consisted
of all information related to each Naval aircraft accident
as required by Opnav instruction 3750.6. The IFARS (in-
dividual flight activity reporting system) data, which was
also available, consisted of all flight hours of Navy pilots
and flight officers. IFARS data also gave all Navy aircraft
flight hours from 1969 to the present time.
The primary form of the accident data used in this study
was an abbreviated format called a "one liner". This con-
sisted of a one line computer printout of various pieces of
data concerning a specific accident. There were various
forms of one liners used at Safety Center. The aircraft
analysts used a one liner with the date of the accident,
type aircraft involved, injuries, assigned causes, and
pilot's name and personal data. There were also formats
which contained only information on the type of aircraft
involved, its power plant, and any mechanical causes of the
accident. The primary format of the accident data that was
used in the analysis of risk was a. statistical form of one
liner called a "Haines one liner". This presented, in
coded format, the date of the accident, type of aircraft,
73

reporting custodian, injuries and damage, location, phase
of flight, causes, and many other pieces of significant
data. A sample of a Haines one liner is given on the fol-
lowing page, along with an interpretation of the data it
presents. If, instead of a coded presentation of the acci-
dent data, a word description was desired, four types of
descriptions were available. Type 1 was a general mishap
narrative; Type 2 a Bio-Med narrative; Type 3 a safety and
survival narrative, and; Type 4 a psychological narrative.
All narratives were drawn from the basic data stored on an
accident, and they are essentially word descriptions of some
of the one liners.
Once preliminary study had been done on the data avail-
able, a collection procedure was set up to obtain the
desired data. This collection was done by a computer sort
of specific data fields in the Haines one liner. Since ac-
cidents were to be investigated by risk areas, the sort
program used the phase of flight code as its primary sort
criteria. In cases where ship/shore operations had to be
differentiated, the type operations data field was interro-
gated. On the following page the actual sort program used
is shown in flow chart form.
It should be mentioned that not all accidents in the
safety center files were used in this study. All accidents
that did not conform to one of the risk areas studied were
excluded from the computer sort, and thus exc]uded from
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accidents, taxi accidents, and accidents on which no infor-
mation was available (coded as undetermined accidents)
.
These accidents comprised a small proportion (1.61 over the
period of primary interest) of the total number of acci-
dents. Since their related risk areas were not significant,
their deletion did not effect the risk analysis in any way.
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FLIGHT PHASE SORTING CRITERIA
First Phase of flight codes are presented on the follow-
ing pages. The below listed sort criteria were used to
divide accidents into the four risk areas, and sub-areas.
RISK AREA FIRST PHASE CODE





Inflight (mission) 42, 44, 411, 4 14, 437, 4 3B, 475
Transition 8,45,4A,4B
Landing All 5 and 6 codes
All codes not listed above were not classified and the as-
sociated accidents were not considered in the analysis. The
breakdown by ship/shore was done by a separate type operation
code. A copy of the phase of operations criteria from the
code manual follows:
Manual of Code Cl assification for Navy Aircraft Accident,








PRIMARY PHASE OF OPERATION - Card Columns 24-36 Card No. 130
1ST PHASE OF OPERATION - Card Columns 29-31 Card No. 130
2ND PHASE OF OPERATION - Card Columns 34-36 Card No. 130
3RD PHASE OF OPERATION - Card Columns 39-41 Card No. 130
PRIMARY PHASE OF OPERATION IS THAT PHASE CODE WHICH COMPLE-
MENTS THE PRIMARY ACCIDENT TYPE CODE AND MUST MATCH ONE OF
THE THREE PHASE CODES WHICH ARE CODED IN SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.
THIS CODE WILL BE USED PRIMARILY FOR STATISTICAL PRESENTATIONS,
CODES
1 STATIC - ENGINE (S) RUNNING WITH AIRCRAFT NOT IN MOTION
CODES CODES
1 ENGAGEMENT (HELOS) 1 REFUELING
2 DISENGAGEMENT (HELOS)
3 PRIOR TO LEAVING CHOCKS
4 PRIOR TO TAKEOFF ATER
LEAVING CHOCKS
5 AFTER COMPLETION OF
FLIGHT (PRIOR TO FINAL
CHOCKING)











OF AIRCRAFT PRIOR TO
TAXI





PHASE OF OPERATION (CONTINUED)
TAXIING - ANY TIME THE AIRCRAFT IS IN MOTION ON THE
GROUND OR WATER UNDER POWER
CODES
1 TO TAKE OFF
2 FROM LANDING
3 WITHIN OTHER AREAS
TAKE OFF - BEGINS WITH THE INSTANT THE AIRCRAFT MOVES
FORWARD (TRANSITION FROM HOVER TO FORWARD
FLIGHT PRIOR TO TRANSITIONAL LIFT FOR
HELOS) ON THE TAKE OFF RUN OR CATAPULT.
THIS PHASE IS TERMINATED WHEN THE AIRCRAFT
ATTAINS ITS CLIMB SCHEDULE. A BOLTER IS
NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN THIS PHASE.
CODES CODES
RUN, FROM TIME TAKEOFF
POWER IS ADDED AND THE
AIRCRAFT IS SET IN MOTION
(MOVING) WITH THE INTENT
OF BECOMING AIRBORNE.




CLIMB - REFERS TO MIS-
HAPS OCCURRING FROM THE
TIME THE AIRCRAFT BREAKS
GROUND UNTIL IT IS















6 HOVER TRANSITION TO
FORWARD FLIGHT
7 AEROBATICS
8 PRIOR TO DECISION
SPEED
9 PRIOR TO REFUSAL
SPEED












IN FLIGHT - INCLUDES PERIOD STARTING FROM THE COM-
MENCEMENT OF THE CLIMBOUT PHASE UNTIL
THE TIME WHEN LANDING PROCEDURES ARE
BEGUN AND LANDING CHECK OFF LIST IS
EMPLOYED.
CODES CODES






2 TRANSIENT - HIGH
ALTITUDE
3 TRANSIENT - LOW
ALTITUDE








I NTENT I ONAL MANEUVERS




FLIGHT OR FROM NORMAL
FLIGHT TO A HOVER












































5 VER BREAK - INCLUDES
MISHAPS OCCURRING FROM
THE TIME THE AIRCRAFT
ENTERS THE SLOT FOR
BREAK INTO THE LANDING
PATTERN THROUGH THE
DOWNWIND LEG UP TO THE
180 DEGREE POSITION ON
FIRST APPROACH ONLY.





AIR TO AIR INTERCEPT
A HIGH ALTITUDE BOMB-
ING .
B MISSILE RUN
C LAY DOWN DELIVERY/
NAPALM













































(.89 to .99 MACH)
B TEST FLIGHT





4 ENGINE RUN IN
CLIMB OUT - INCLUDES
MISHAPS OCCURRING
FROM TIME THE AIRCRAFT
IS CLEANED UP AND AT-
TAINED CLIMB SCHEDULE
UNTIL THE AIRCRAFT HAS
REACHED THE DESIRED
ALTITUDE FOR COMMENCE-
MENT OF ASSIGNED MISSION
9 RAPELLING
TROOP DEBARKATION














PHASE OF OPERATION (CONTINUED)
CODES
CODES CODES




4 TURNING BASE ON
CCA/GCA OR IFR
APPROACHES
Y FOLLOWED BY AUTO-
ROTATION
INCLUDES THAT PERIOD FROM THE TIME THE PILOT
PASSES THE 180 DEGREE POSITION DURING A
CIRCLING APPROACH; OR WHILE ON FINAL DURING
A STRAIGHT- IN APPROACH TO THE END OF THE
LANDING ROLL ON THE RUNWAY; OR THE TIME
WHEN THE AIRCRAFT SLOWS TO TAXIING SPEED;
OR THE AIRCRAFT IS BROUGHT TO STOP BY CROSS
-
DECK PENDANT OR BARRICADE IN CARRIER LANDING,
1 APPROACH - INCLUDES AC-
CIDENTS FROM THE 180
DEGREE POSITION (TURN-
ING BASE) THROUGH THE




WHEN FORWARD SPEED IS
DECREASED TO A DESCENT
SPEED APPROXIMATELY 55
TO 60 KNOTS. THIS
PHASE ENDS WITH THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE
FLARE.
2 LEVEL OFF AND/OR TOUCH-
DOWN - INCLUDES THAT
PERIOD FROM THE MOMENT
THE AIRCRAFT CHANGES FROM
AND APPROACH ATTITUDE TO
A LANDING ATTITUDE UNTIL
THE MOMENT THE AIRCRAFT
MAIN MOUNTS MAKES CONTACT









8 BOLTER - LSO APPROACH
IN FLIGHT ENGAGEMENT
OF ARRESTING WIRE










OFF ARE TO BE CLASSIFIED
AS LANDING ACCIDENTS.
FOR HELICOPTERS IT COM-
MENCES WITH THE FLARE
AND ENDS WHEN CONTACT
WITH THE GROUND OR
WATER IS MADE.
B FRESNEL APPROACH








ROLL OUT - INCLUDES THAT
PERIOD AFTER TOUCHDOWN













AND GO LANDING PRACTICE
THE ROLL IS THAT PERIOD
FROM THE TIME THE AIR-
CRAFT TOUCHES DOWN UNTIL
THE TIME PILOT APPLIES
POWER FOR TAKE OFF. FOR
HELICOPTERS, IT COM-
MENCES WITH THE CONTACT
WITH THE GROUND OR WATER
(TOUCH DOWN) AND ENDS
WHEN THE HELICOPTER'S
FORWARD SPEED IS STOPPED.
G MANUAL OPERATED
VISUAL LANDING AID
H MODE I (ACLS)
J MODE II (SEMI -ACLS)
K MODE III OR CASE
III (FULL INSTRU-
MENT CCA APPROACH)
L CASE I (VFR AP-
PROACH)
M CASE II (TACAN AP-
PROACH TO VFR CON-
DITIONS)
Y FOLLOWED BY AUTO-
ROTATION
4 BOLTER
WAVE OFF - BEGINS AT THE TIME WHEN PILOT ABORTS HIS
LANDING ATTEMPT (APPLICATION OF POWER) ON
FINAL APPROACH AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LSO,
OR OTHER LANDING DIRECTORS, OR CHOOSES TO
DO SO ON HIS OWN, AND ATTEMPTS TO REGAIN












CAUGHT WIRE ON WAVE OFF












6 MODE I (ACLS)





8 MODE III OR CASE
III (FULL INSTRU-
MENT CCA APPROACH)
9 CASE I (VFR AP-
PROACH)
CASE II (TACAN AP-
PROACH TO VFR
CONDITIONS)
Y FOLLOWED BY AUTO-
ROTATION
ACTUAL OR SIMULATED TO BE USED WHEN
PILOT EFFECTS TO AUTOROTATE AND A
REPORTABLE MISHAP IS INVOLVED.
1 LANDING
2 POWER RECOVERY








































1 ENGINES RUNNING - NOT






2 TAXI 3 FIELD HANGAR
3 OTHER 4 FIELD PARKING LINE









RUNWAY /TAX I WAY/END
ZONE
7 STARTING ENGINES 8 UNPREPARED AREA






















UNDETERMINED THIS CODE WILL BE USED WHEN THE PHASE
OF FLIGHT CANNOT BE DETERMINED FROM
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